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concern about loss of nuclear weapons from stock piles in
the nations that comprised the former Soviet Union
(e.g., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan).
Evidence suggests that this laxness in security has
facilitated the ability of rogue groups to obtain nuclear
weapons and materials.

Abstract
Since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 there has
been apprehension that the United States may be illprepared to prevent future terrorist events. One source of
concern is that a Radioactive Dispersion Device (RDD)
could be detonated at a vulnerable target anywhere in the
nation. A RDD, also known as a “dirty bomb, is a
conventional explosive packed with radioactive material.
The explosion could disperse radioactive material over a
wide area. The target could be an icon associated with
American democracy and government, critical systems
and infrastructure, a water supply, a nuclear power plant
and others. Such an event could result in impact to
citizens and communities on a number of levels: physical,
economic, psychological and fiscal. The paper provides
an overview of salient issues associated with RDD and
offers perspectives on the vulnerability of the U.S., to
attacks using such devices.

Similarly, individuals such as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan
and the policies of states such as North Korea and Iran
have also probably provided opportunity for WMD or
related technology to get in the hands of terrorists.
Preventing terrorist groups from obtaining WMD will
continue to be a major challenge for national security
agencies.
While the U.S. has been fortunate, thus far, in avoiding
incidents involving WMD (although the anthrax event in
late 2001 discussed later may have been a wakeup call) it
is difficult to know whether this has been due to improved
national security procedures or because of fortuitous
circumstances.

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction

2. Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD)

The events of September 11, 2001 raised concerns
about America’s vulnerability to a number of potential
terrorist threats. Of particular concern has been the use of
“weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). WMD is a
generic term that could include nuclear weapons, toxic
chemicals and/or biological agents. A nuclear WMD
could result in death, destruction and long term
contamination of extensive areas of a community
(equivalent, for example, to the damage experienced from
the Chernobyl event). Significant economic impacts and
“stigma” effects could result. Had the 9/11 terrorists
utilized a nuclear WMD the consequences would have
been even more catastrophic.

There are other concerns, however. The potential use of
Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) should also
heighten our apprehension. RDD are also termed “dirty
bombs,” or “weapons of mass disruption.”
Many Americans first heard the term dirty bomb on
June 10, 2002, when Attorney General John Ashcroft
announced the arrest of Jose Padilla on the charge of
plotting to detonate a device containing both high
explosive and very radioactive material.1
What are RDD? Graham Allison, a leading authority on
nuclear weapons and national security issues, defines a
RDD as “conventional explosives packed into radioactive
material.”2 “(RDD) can take many forms—from sticks of
dynamite packed … with cesium to a fertilizer-based
truck bomb wrapped in cobalt.”3 A RDD could be

The fear of WMD has been compounded by reports of
vulnerable security arrangements at critical infrastructure:
ports, nuclear power plants, chemical manufacturing
facilities, refineries and others.
Exacerbating the concerns has been an apparent
breakdown in security arrangements in nations producing
nuclear weapons. There is evidence to suggest, for
example, that nuclear weapons/resources are vulnerable to
loss in a number of nations. In particular, there has been
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manufactured by surrounding TNT, C-4, or other
chemical explosive with a radioisotope.

3. Terrorist Objectives
The objectives of terrorists or rogue states are
manifold. Besides causing death and destruction, other
important goals are creating impact to economic interests,
spreading fear among the civilian population, fostering
distrust in government, and attempting to change
governmental policies, particularly in the Middle East.
Osama bin Laden and his cohorts have acknowledged the
possible use of radioactivity in terrorist operations.7

Many terrorist groups have the skill and materials
needed to make the explosive part of the device.
Terrorists could also disperse radioactive material without
an explosive by spraying, scattering, or simply dumping
it.4
The threat posed by terrorist RDD use and the
magnitude of potential impact are matters of contention.
Some experts believe that terrorists could, without great
difficulty, obtain radioactive material and construct an
RDD. (O)thers assert that the inherent difficulties of
handling radioactive material (coupled) with (causing
relatively) few direct casualties make RDD less likely
terrorist weapons.5 Despite the possible complexities, the
potential use of RDD by terrorists makes it imperative
that this source be considered in national security
planning efforts.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined
RDD issues extensively.
The CRS surmised that
terrorists with small amounts of radioactive material
might create as much panic RDD could attempt to
influence policies by causing the following actions:8

3.1 Deaths and injuries.
Any immediate casualties would most likely come from
the explosion of a dirty bomb.9

RDD can be produced employing biological, chemical
and radioactive materials. The radioactive segment,
however, is the most significant for reasons ranging from
the actual risk itself to the perception by the public of its
danger. The focus of the paper, therefore, will be placed
on the radioactive component of the RDD.

3.2 Panic.
Small amounts of radioactive material might create as
much panic as larger amounts. This could result in the
voluntary or involuntary mass evacuation of citizens,

The radioactive materials most likely to cause harm,
based only on their physical properties, are also those
most widely available and having significant commercial
application. A partial list of purposes to which radioactive
elements are applied include medical, academic,
agricultural, industrial, food irradiation, smoke detection,
communication, navigation, and in oil well logging. 6

3.3 Recruitment.
The worldwide media coverage of a RDD attack would be
a powerful advertisement for a terrorist group claiming
responsibility. This could assist in recruitment efforts.

3.4 Asset (or geographic area) denial.

The prevalence of these sources in the public domain,
coupled with inadequate control and monitoring
mechanisms, poses a significant threat to health and
security, not only from the possible terrorist use of
radioactive materials, but also from accidents.

Public concern over the presence of radioactive material
might lead people to abandon a subway system, building,
university, or areas of a city for months to years due to
contamination concerns.

3.5 Economic disruption.

Additional impacts from RDD would include negative
economic influences (e.g., cost of cleanup, business
disruption, and long term contamination) and stigma
effects to citizens and communities. These will be
discussed in more detail later in the report.

If a port, central area of a city, or other area of viable
economic activity were contaminated with radioactive
material, commerce might be suspended or curtailed. This
could create economic impact.
7
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(c) The greater the quantity of radioactive material, the
greater the extent of physical impact.

3.6 Long-term casualties.
Inhalation of radioactive material or exposure to gamma
sources could lead to (an unknown number of long-term)
casualties.

(d) The greater the quantity of conventional explosives
employed, the greater the potential for radioactive
material to be dispersed more widely.

4. What are the Odds?

(e) Meteorological conditions would play a role in the
dispersion of radioactive materials. Wind speed and
direction, for example, would determine the dispersion
location and the extent of contamination. Precipitation
would concentrate radioactivity on certain land surfaces
and water sources.

How feasible would it be for terrorists to obtain
materials to develop a RDD and to carry out an attack?
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated
that approximately one licensed U.S. (radioactive) source
is lost every day of the year.10 An August 2003 United
States General Accounting Office report states that from
1998 to 2002 there were over 1300 incidents in which
sealed sources were lost, stolen, or abandoned in the
United States.11 These “orphan” sources generally remain
undiscovered.

(f) The availability of the radioactive elements, the
portability of the weapon, and the characteristics of the
environment will also determine the effect of the RDD.

6. Potential RDD Impacts

By far the most likely route for terrorist acquisition of
intermediate amounts of radioactive material (defined as
between 100 and 10,000 curies) is open and legal
purchase from a legitimate supplier. Until the 9/11
terrorist attacks, regulation of radioactive sources was
focused on ensuring the safe use of the material by people
and organizations presumed to be acting without malice.

In examining the potential impacts from the detonation
of a RDD, it is first important to consider the costs
incurred from the events of September 11th. These
included thousands of deaths, the destruction of buildings
and infrastructure, billions of dollars in loss of economic
activity, costs of cleanup, reconstruction and health care.
It could also be argued that 9/11 caused the weakening of
American liberties, and the loss of life and treasure from
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition to purchase, the prevalence of equipment
employing radioactive elements for medical and other
purposes provides ample opportunities for theft.

A RDD strategically placed in a large American city, at
an event or in an area where large numbers of people
congregate could create extensive and similar negative
effects. Previous experience suggests that RDD could
cause impacts disproportionate to the significance of the
incident.

5. How Destructive are RDD?
The destructiveness of a RDD is contingent on a
number of factors: 12
(a) The characteristics of the radioactive element
employed is important (e.g., energy, type of radiation,
half-life). Radioactive elements (including their isotopes),
using cesium, bond strongly to concrete and asphalt. This
could also complicate decontamination efforts and
increase cleanup costs.

Adding to the uncertainty is that a number of methods
can be employed to disseminate radiological material. For
example, some forms of isotopes can be dissolved in
solvents and sprayed widely; still others can be burned or
vaporized.13

(b) Smaller particles would be dispersed more easily (than
larger ones) and, potentially, (be transported) to greater
distances. Smaller particles are also more readily
inhalable.

Any (comprehensive) plan to respond to an RDD must
take into account all of the reasonable ways such a device
might function, including those so stealthy that the
population might ingest or inhale significant doses before
an attack becomes apparent.14
Figure 1 is illustrative of the potential geographical
impact of a RDD placed in the Capitol Hill area of
Washington, D.C. As discussed in the prior section the
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extent of contamination is contingent on a number of
variables. Similar effects could be experienced in
communities throughout the country.

terrorist attacks was in excess of $30 Billion. The
immediate response costs exceeded $11 Billion.18
Much of the private cost of recovery from the
September 2001 attacks was paid by insurance. That may
not be the case following an RDD attack. Radiation is a
specifically excluded risk in virtually all policies written
in the United States. The government, therefore, would
have to step in to subsidize economic recovery after an
attack, or some form of insurance reform would be
required to facilitate economic recovery.19

Damages from a RDD (or WMD) can be categorized as
deterministic, stochastic, economic, psychosocial and
physical.

6.1 Deterministic Injuries.
Radiation is said to cause deterministic harm if an
individual can be identified who received a known
exposure to radiation and became ill as a result. Such
illness or injury can include classic radiation sickness
(hematological effects, loss of appetite, vomiting and
other gastrointestinal damage, hair loss, and death) or
radiation burns on the skin. In general, the threshold dose
for deterministic injury is quite high.15

6.4 Psychosocial Damage.20
Psychosocial effects are likely to be one of the most
serious impacts from use of a RDD. The fear of ionizing
radiation is a deep-seated and frequently irrational
carryover from the Cold War.21
Graham Allison describes probable impacts in the
aftermath of a RDD incident. “After a radiation bomb
attack, the panic will likely be even more widespread.
Fear of radiation exposure … will prompt many people to
flee their homes.” 22

6.2 Stochastic Injuries.
A common assumption is that any radiation dose, no
matter how small, can cause harm and that the biological
response increases with the size of the dose. It is
conceivable that some individuals exposed to quite small
doses of radiation might develop cancers. The risk of
developing a health problem, including cancer, can
increase with added radiation exposure.16

The anthrax attacks of October 2001 in Washington,
D.C. may provide an analogue. In that event letters
containing anthrax spores were sent to Congressional
representatives and media personnel. Anthrax spores were
spread through the ventilation system in the Hart Senate
Office Building and several Washington, D.C. area post
offices. Three months later, after extensive disinfection
with chlorine dioxide gas, at a cost of $20 million, the
buildings were finally reopened.23 Associated with this
event was the considerable panic to the public from the
uncertain risk.

6.3 Economic Impact.
It is likely that any RDD involving more than a few curies
of radioactive material will contaminate some areas so
heavily that any economic viability would be permanently
destroyed. The contaminated area would either be
abandoned and fenced, any buildings razed, the soil (at
the site) excavated to a depth of a meter or so, and
removing both building waste and soil to a low-level
radioactive waste depository (as happened at Goiânia
discussed in the next section). Even after cleanup has
been accomplished, there would likely be residual public
fear of the site. Any tourist related activities would be
impacted and other commerce handicapped. If an
agricultural area is involved, the farmers may find it
difficult to market their produce.17

6.5 Infrastructure Damages.
In the long term (if a RDD is detonated in an urban
area), entire city blocks will have to be decontaminated.
Radioactive dust particles will require vacuuming or
pressure washing to remove. Sandblasting and acid will
be needed where radioactive material has penetrated
deeply. Concrete, asphalt, vegetation, and topsoil might
have to be excavated and disposed of safely. Thousands

The economic impact on a major metropolitan area
from a successful RDD attack could exceed that of the
September 2001 attacks. The estimated cost to return the
lower Manhattan area to conditions prior to the September
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of people would have to relocate, and some might never
be allowed to return.”24

at an abandoned cancer clinic in Goiânia, Goias State,
Brazil. Goiânia is a city with a mixed industrial and
tourist economy located west of Brazil’s capital, Brasilia.
Five days after the theft a junkyard worker pried open the
lead canister to reveal what was described as “a pretty
blue, glowing dust,” which turned out to be radioactive
cesium137. In the following days, scores of Goiânian
citizens were exposed to the radioactive element.25
Several deaths and many injuries were attributed to
exposure to the radioactive element.

Figure 1.
Hypothetical Cesium Bomb Impact
Washington, D.C.

1 Cancer death/100

Costs to all levels of Brazilian government and the
economy were dramatic. The physical decontamination
effort, for example, covered about one square kilometer
(roughly 40 city blocks), demolished seven homes and
other buildings, and produced about 3,500 cubic meters of
radioactive waste. The clean-up costs amounted to $20
million. Hundreds of millions of dollars were estimated to
have been lost due to the collapse of the tourism industry
and impacts to businesses. Many people left the area due
to fears of the remaining contamination, and although not
contaminated, prices of manufactured products fell by 40
percent and stayed at that level for 30 to 40 days.26

1 Cancer death/10,000

1 Cancer death/1,000

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) itemized
negative economic effects from the incident:27
“Economically, there was discrimination against
products from Goiânia, resulting in a 20 percent decrease
in the sales of cattle, grains, and other agricultural
products from the region. Tourism decreased virtually to
zero and the gross domestic product for the region
declined from pre-accident levels. In total, the direct and
indirect costs for emergency response and remedial action
are estimated to be $36 million.28

Source: Federation of American Scientists

News reports about the accidents and events associated
with modern science of technology (which could include
the radioactive elements in the Goiânia incident) have, in
certain cases, stigmatized places, products and
technologies.29

6.6 Other Effects.
Finally, because of the great trauma that the nation
experienced due to 9/11, RDD could greatly exacerbate
national insecurities on terrorism and create other
unknown effects to our government and way of life.

Assessing the impacts from incidents such as Goiânia,
a minor event involving a relatively unimportant
radioactive source, provides some perspective on
potential impacts that could take place from the
detonation of a dirty bomb.

7. The Lessons from Goiânia and TMI
Examining an analogous incident, although unrelated to
terrorism, can illustrate potential economic impacts. What
is interesting is that these effects can be attributed more to
fear than actual risk.

25
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While in the case of Goiânia cultural differences were
examined (although Goiânia was a somewhat
sophisticated industrial area located relatively near to the
nation’s capital of Brasilia) there is evidence to suggest
that Americans would react similarly.

To learn more about RDD there are numerous excellent
references available. The Reference section at the end of
the text notes several excellent documents.

The accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear
power facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on March
28, 1979, demonstrated that the United States is not
immune to situations of unpredictable behavior. For
example, what began as an evacuation advisory from
Pennsylvania’s Governor Thornburgh many was looked
upon by the public more seriously.

The following are selected recommendations by
authorities that would assist in preventing or remediating
effects from a RDD:31

9. Recommendations.

▪ RDD must be recognized by the Department of
Homeland Security and related state emergency response
agencies as a potentially significant terrorist threat. While
WMD are being evaluated by some agencies, the use of
RDD by terrorists may be more likely. Greater planning
efforts are required both for prevention purposes and to
ameliorate potential effects should an attack occur.

“Thousands of people made hasty preparations to leave
their homes, phone lines jammed, lines formed at gas
stations, and traffic backed up. There was palpable
concern, confusion, and anger. Approximately 144,000
people within a fifteen-mile radius of the plant evacuated
at some point during the crisis.”30

• The Department of Energy weapons laboratories, in
cooperation with other agencies and institutions, should
identify, test, and deploy technologies that would enable
the rapid cleanup and decontamination of buildings,
vehicles, and similar.

Goiânia and TMI provide important examples of how the
public might react to an attack involving RDD.

• Citizens are not currently able to obtain insurance to pay
for the results of radiological terrorist events. Even the
smallest of attacks could result in financial catastrophe for
victims. It goes without saying that the cost of cleanup,
even if feasible, would be too great to be borne by
individual owners and businesses. (Indeed, cleanup to the
degree that buildings could be reoccupied might not be
possible)

8. Summary
RDD pose a unique threat to American citizens. While
an RDD attack is unlikely to cause mass fatalities, such
weapons offer the potential to create mass panic and
extensive economic impact. RDD could be constructed
with small quantities of fissionable or non-fissionable
material laced with chemicals and biological agents. In
addition to utilizing potentially common radioactive
materials from, for example, x-ray machines (Cs137),
smoke detectors and similar, etc., the devices are easily
made portable.

There is precedent for government to provide insurance
assistance.
The Federal government, for example,
currently subsidizes flood insurance. Providing some
form of national insurance against radiological terrorism
could be explored. The Price-Anderson Act (PAA)
already offers insurance coverage for nuclear accidents
caused by a licensed company or nuclear power facility
acting within the terms of its license. PAA compensated
the victims of the Three Mile Island event. Expanding
coverage under PAA to include victims of radiological
terror would be one way to compensate uninsured
victims. Another option would be that the government
could mandate the inclusion of radiation as an insurable
risk in standard-form insurance policies.

Part of the danger is attributable to the fact that
extensive amounts of materials, radioactive and chemical
are widely available in the nation. Since equipment
utilizing radioactive elements have become integral to
day-to-day American life it will be extremely difficult to
prevent the loss of these materials.
Despite the sense of vulnerability to terrorism created
by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, an adequate
system of licensing and control of radioactive sources
designed need to be given priority in national security
efforts.

• Evidence suggests that residual radiation will reduce
property values in or near a contaminated area. This could
be offset by a direct payment by the federal government
to affected property owners. Legislative or regulatory
remedies could also provide relief to Americans in the

30
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wake of an RDD attack on issues such as property value
impacts.

[8] Medalia, Jonathan. Terrorist “Dirty Bombs”: A Brief
Primer. Congressional Research Service RS 21528,
October 29, 2003.

• Where feasible, non-radioactive technologies such as Xrays and accelerators should be substituted for radioactive
sources. This will reduce the opportunities for loss, theft
and misuse of radioactive materials.

[9] Oldenburg, Don. “How Bad Would A Dirty Blast Be?
Here's What the Experts Say, Washington Post, June 13,
2002

• A program of public education about the dangers of
RDDs, how to behave after an attack, should be instituted
as soon as possible.

[10] United States General Accounting Office. “Nuclear
Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources,” August 2003,
GAO-03-804.

• Citizens can contribute to preventing RDD attacks or
reducing their effects. Since 9/11 most Americans are
aware, for example, of the importance of identifying
unattended packages or of reporting individuals acting
strangely. Developing “situational awareness” in citizens
is important. Some of our biggest successes have been
made by an observant public.32

[11] United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
“Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes,” March 6, 2002.
[12] Walker, J. Samuel. (2004) Three Mile Island: A
Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. (Los Angeles:
University of California Press).
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